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Abstract
This report presents a non-interference monitoring mechanism for sequential
programs. Non-interference is a property of the information flows of a program.
It implies the respect of the confidentiality of the secret information manip-
ulated. The approach taken uses an automaton based monitor. During the
execution, abstractions of the events occurring are sent to the automaton. The
automaton uses those inputs to track the information flows and to control the
execution by forbidding or editing dangerous actions. The mechanism proposed
is proved to be sound and more efficient than a type system similar to the
historical one developed by Volpano, Smith and Irvine.
1 Introduction
With the intensification of communication between information systems, the
interest for researches on security has increased. Security is usually partitioned
in three main domains:
confidentiality focuses on the control of the dissemination of information,
integrity is concerned by the incorruptibility of important information,
availability ensures the accessibility of resources to legal users.
This report deals with the concept of confidentiality; and more precisely with
the notion of non-interference in sequential programs. This notion is based on
ideas from classical information theory [Ash56]. It has first been introduced by
Goguen and Meseguer [GM82] as the absence of strong dependency (a concept
developed by Cohen [Coh77]).
“information is transmitted from a source to a destination only when
variety in the source can be conveyed to the destination” Cohen
[Coh77, Sect.1].
“One group of users, using a certain set of commands, is noninter-
fering with another group of users if what the first group does with
those commands has no effect on what the second group of users can
see.” Goguen and Meseguer [GM82, Sect.1].
A sequential program is said to be non-interfering if the values of the public
(or low) outputs do not depend on the values of the secret (or high) inputs. In
other words, a program is non-interfering if the secret inputs do not interfere
with the public outputs. Following the notation of Sabelfeld and Myers [SM03],
the notion of non-interference (with regard to the equivalence relations =L and
≈L) can be expressed as follows, with Σ denoting the set of all program states:
∀σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ. σ1 =L σ2 ⇒ [[P]]σ1 ≈L [[P]]σ2 (1)
This equation states that a program P is said to be non-interfering if and only
if for any two states σ1 and σ2 that associate the same values to low (public)
data (written σ1 =L σ2), the executions of the program P in the initial states
σ1 and σ2 are indistinguishable by an attacker having access only to the low
(public) outputs. Those executions are termed low-equivalent ; written [[P]]σ1 ≈L
[[P]]σ2. The low-equivalence relation characterizes the observational power of the
attacker by stating what he can distinguish. This may vary from requiring the
low (public) data of the final states to be equal for both executions, to requiring
the two executions to have the same energy consumption.
As emphasized by the survey paper of Sabelfeld and Myers [SM03], there
are already lots of works on non-interference. The particularity of the approach
developed in this report lies in:
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1. the fact that the proposed method analyzes executions and not programs,
2. the mechanism used in order to ensure the confidentiality of secret data.
The majority of previous research [BN05, Mye99a, PS03, ABHR99, BS99, MS01,
SS01, Smi01], as the ones of Mizuno and Schmidt [MS92] and Volpano, Smith,
and Irvine [VSI96], associate the notion of non-interference to the level of a pro-
gram; they develop static analyses which accept or reject programs depending
on the ability of all its executions to ensure the confidentiality of the secrets
manipulated. The work presented here accepts or rejects a single execution of a
program independently1 of the behavior of all the other executions. This report
introduces a monitoring mechanism which guaranties the respect of the confi-
dentiality of secret data; either the monitor deduces that the current execution
is non-interfering or it alters the behavior of the program in order to obtain a
non-interfering execution.
The next section gives an overview of the approach. It defines some notions
used, as well as introduces the scope of the work. Section 3 defines the mon-
itoring semantics. This semantics is based on an automaton which is defined
in the same section. The properties of monitored executions and a comparison
with a type system are contained in Sect. 4. Then the report skims through
related works in the domain of automata based monitoring and information flow
monitoring. Finally, the conclusion comes in Sect. 6.
2 Outline
The work presented in this report aims at monitoring executions. So it is dealing
with the notion of non-interfering execution and not with the notion of non-
interfering program. An execution is said to be non-interfering if its public (low)
outputs have the same values as the public outputs of any other execution having
the same public (low) inputs. Based on the formal definition of non-interference
given in (1), the property of being a non-interfering execution (started in the
initial state σ) of a program P can be formalized as follows:
∀σ′ ∈ Σ : σ =L σ′ ⇒ [[P]]σ ≈L [[P]]σ′ (2)
Compared to (1), the universal quantifier of σhas disappeared. The reason is
that this property is specialized to a particular program state: the initial state
of the execution of concern.
The notion of non-interference is intrinsically linked to the notion of infor-
mation flow. This report distinguishes three types of information flows:
direct flows Such flows appear when an assignment is executed. For example,
if the assignment x := y is executed, then a direct flow from y to x is
generated.
1Not exactly independently; but one execution can be detected as non-interfering even if
some others are interfering.
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indirect flows Such flows concern a flow from the context of execution to the
value of a variable. For the sequential programs studied here, the context
of execution consists only in the program counter. For multi-threaded
programs, the context would also include the locks owned by other threads
for example. There are two types of indirect flows:
explicit indirect flows Such flows appear when an assignment is exe-
cuted. For example, if the statement if b then x := y else skip end
is executed with b = true, then an explicit indirect flow from b to x
is generated.
implicit indirect flows Such flows appear when an assignment is not
executed. For example, if the statement if b then x := y else skip end
is executed with b = false, then an implicit indirect flow from b to
x is generated.
2.1 Background
The idea of using automata to monitor the good behavior of executions is not
recent. Schneider [Sch00] characterized the type of security policies which can
be enforced using execution monitors (also called truncation-automaton based
monitors in [LBW05a] or reference monitors). Such types of monitors are only
able to look at executed commands and to stop an execution. His conclusion is
that this approach enables only the enforcement of safety properties. A safety
property is above all a property. In the same paper, Schneider states:
“In Alpern and Schneider [1985] and the literature on linear-time
concurrent program verification, a set of executions is called a prop-
erty if set membership is determined by each element alone and not
by other members of the set.” Schneider [Sch00, Sect. 2]
Considering a single program execution to be a sequence of actions, this defini-
tion of a property can be formalized as follows:
Definition 2.1 (Property [Sch00, LBW05a]). A security policy P is deemed to
be a property of a set of executions Ω if and only if there exists a computable
predicate P̂ on executions such that P is a predicate over sets of executions with
the following form:
P(Ω) = ∀ω ∈ Ω : P̂(ω)
Equation (2) shows that, for an execution, the property of being non-interfering
depends on some other executions. Therefore, there is no predicate P̂ on the
sequence of actions evaluated by an execution such that P̂ can decide if an ex-
ecution is or is not non-interfering. So, truncation automata are not sufficient
to enforce non-interference. The title of [TA05] (“Secure Information Flow as a
Safety Problem”), by Terauchi and Aiken, may let the reader think that trunca-
tion automata can indeed enforce non-interference. In their paper, they reduce
the non-interference problem to, what they call, a 2-safety problem. Following
the definition 2.1, 2-safety problems can be defined as follows:
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Definition 2.2 (2-safety problem [TA05]). A security policy P is deemed to
be a 2-safety problem of a set of executions Ω if and only if there exists a
computable predicate P̂ on pairs of executions such that P is a predicate over
sets of executions with the following form:
P(Ω) = ∀ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω : P̂(ω1, ω2)
Although this definition enables non-interference to be expressed as a 2-
safety problem and gives really good results with theorem provers and model
checkers, it does not help execution monitors to deal with non-interference.
First, it defines non-interference on the set of all executions. Following this
definition, all the executions of a program, or none, are non-interfering. Fur-
thermore, verifying that a set of executions Ω is non-interfering requires to apply
P̂ on all the pairs of Ω.
More powerful automata are described in [LBW05a]. They are called Edit
Automata. On a given sequence of actions, those automata can insert, suppress
or edit some actions in order to enforce what is called infinite renewal properties
[LBW05b]. Those are still properties and thus non-interference does not belong
to this set. However, as shown by this report, by increasing the information
given to an automaton similar to Edit Automata, it is possible to enforce non-
interfering executions.
The work presented in this report is not the first one trying to enforce confi-
dentiality at run time. RIFLE [VBC+04] is a “runtime information-flow security
system”. It is designed to track the information flow during the execution of
converted binaries. The system uses the collected information to enforce users’
confidentiality policies. However, it does not enforce non-interference. The
reason is that it does not take into consideration implicit indirect flows. By
doing so, RIFLE ignores executions with equivalent public inputs but taking a
different path. As Ashby states:
“the information carried by a particular message depends on the set
it comes from. The information conveyed is not an intrinsic property
of the individual message.” [Ash56, § 7/5 page 124].
The authors of RIFLE are conscious of this fact. They notice that, in order to
enforce stronger constraints on the information flow (like non-interference), the
monitoring mechanism must be aware of the commands which are not evaluated
by a given execution. This is part of the approach taken in the work presented
in this report.
2.2 The Approach Used
We consider a simple imperative language extended with an output statement.
Its grammar is given in Fig. 1. Statements (S) are either sequences (S ; S),
conditionals (B), or atomic statements (A). The output statement, “output e”,
is a generic statement used to represent any kind of public (low) output. For
example, it can be used to represent the action of printing the value of an
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expression e on the terminal running the program, producing a sound, or lay out
a new window on the desktop screen. Only public outputs (i.e. outputs that are
visible by standard users) are coded using the output statement. Secret outputs
are simply ignored. For example, sending a message m on a public network
is represented by the statement “output m”; on the other hand, sending an
encrypted message n on a public network is abstracted by “output θ”, where
θ is a default constant which emphasizes the fact that an attacker is unable to
decrypt an encoded message. Finally, sending a message on a private network,
to which standard users do not have access, does not appear in the code of the
programs studied.
A ::= x := e
| skip
| output e
B ::= if e then S else S end
| while e do S done
S ::= S ; S | B | A
Figure 1: Grammar of the language
The standard semantics of the language (Fig. 2) is described using evaluation
rules, written s ` S o=⇒ s′. This is read as follows: statement S executed in state
σ yields state σ’ and output o. A program state is simply a value store mapping
variable names to their current value. σ(x) is the value associated to the variable
x in the store σ. This is extended to expressions, so that σ(e) is the value of
the expression e when the value store is σ. An output sequence is an empty
sequence (written ), a single value (for example, σ(e)) or the concatenation
of two other sequences (written o1 o2). The semantics is a standard big-step
operational semantics [Kah87] (also called natural semantics); except for the
output sequences which, however, come without any surprise.
The monitoring principles. Non-interference formalizes the fact that there
is no information flowing from secret (high) inputs to public (low) outputs. In
the approach taken in this report, the secret inputs of a program P are the initial
values of the variables belonging to a set written S(P). The only public output
is the output sequence resulting from the execution. Contrary to the majority
of works on non-interference, the values of the variables in the program state
are never considered as directly accessible by an attacker (even at the end of
the execution). Consequently, the values of the variables in the program state
are never considered as public outputs.
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σ ` x := e =⇒ σ[x 7→ σ(e)] (EO-ASSIGN)
σ ` output e σ(e)===⇒ σ (EO-PRINT)
σ ` skip =⇒ σ (EO-SKIP)
σ(e) = v σ ` Sv o=⇒ σ′
σ ` if e then Strue else Sfalse end o=⇒ σ′
(EO-IF)
σ(e) = true σ ` S ; while e do S done o=⇒ σ′
σ ` while e do S done o=⇒ σ′ (EO-WHILEtrue)
σ(e) = false
σ ` while e do S done =⇒ σ (EO-WHILEfalse)
σ ` S1 o1==⇒ σ′ σ′ ` S2 o2==⇒ σ′′
σ ` S1 ; S2 o1 o2====⇒ σ′′
(EO-SEQ)
Figure 2: Semantics outputting the values of low-outputs
The main principle of the monitoring mechanism is based on notions of
classical information theory [Ash56] about information transmission. Cohen
states it as follows:
“information can be transmitted from a to b over execution of H
[(a sequence of actions)] if, by suitably varying the initial value of
a (exploring the variety in a), the resulting value in b after H’s
execution will also vary (showing that the variety is conveyed to b).”
Cohen [Coh77, Sect. 3].
Hence, for preventing information flows from secret inputs to public outputs,
the monitoring mechanism will make sure that variety in the initial values of the
variables in the set S(P) is not conveyed to the output sequence. This means
that the monitoring mechanism, which works on a single execution (this implies
that the initial values of the variables belonging to S(P) are fixed), will ensure
that even if the initial values of the variables belonging to S(P) were different
(bringing back variety in it) the output sequence would be identical; and hence,
enforce that variety in S(P) is not conveyed to the output sequence.
The monitoring automaton has two jobs. The first one is to track “variety”.
By that, we mean to track entities (for example program variables, program
counter, . . . ) which may have different values if the initial values of the variables
belonging to S(P) were different. The second job is to prevent “variety” to be
conveyed to the output sequence; in other words, to ensure that the output
sequence would be identical for any execution for which the public inputs (i.e.
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the initial values of the variables not belonging to S(P)) are identical. In order
to complete the first job, the states of the monitoring automaton are pairs. The
first element of this pair is a set of variables. At any step of the computation, it
contains all the variables which have “variety” (i.e. which may have a different
value if the initial values of the variables belonging to S(P) were different). The
second element of the pair is a word belonging to the language whose alphabet
is {>,⊥} and is described by the regular expression (>+⊥)∗. This word tracks
“variety” in the context of the execution (or the value of the program counter).
The second job (preventing “variety” to be conveyed to the output sequence) is
accomplished by authorizing, denying or editing output statements depending
on the current state of the monitoring automaton.
What precision is lost by the abstraction? The automaton described
here does not have information about the real values of the variables. It just
knows if a variable may or may not have “variety”. This feature prevents the
automaton to detect some “safe” executions. An example of such an execution
follows. The program has two inputs h (containing secrets) and l (containing
public information).
x := l ;
i f h
then x := 1
e l se x := x / 2
end;
output x
The execution, for which h is true and l is 2, is safe. Whatever the value of h is,
the executions of the program, for which l is 2, just output 1 (the variety in h is
not conveyed to the output sequence). So, in those cases, there is no flow from h
to what is outputted. However, to be able to discover this fact, the automaton
would need some information about the real values of variables. This is not the
case with the work proposed here, so the above example is out of reach of the
proposed monitoring mechanism.
We will demonstrate in Sect. 4 that this mechanism is still of interest. Before
that, the next section gives a formal definition of the monitoring automaton and
of the monitored semantics.
3 Definition of the Monitoring Mechanism
The monitoring mechanism is divided into two main elements. The first one is
an automaton similar to Edit Automata [LBW05a]. It inputs are abstractions of
the actions accomplished during an execution. Its role is to track the information
flow and authorize, forbid or edit the actions of the monitored execution in order
to enforce non-interference. The second element of the monitoring mechanism is
a semantics of monitored executions which merge together the behavior of the
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monitoring automaton and of the standard output semantics given in Fig. 2.
This section first describes the monitoring automaton and then the semantics
of monitored executions.
3.1 The Automaton
The transition function of the automaton used to monitor an execution is inde-
pendent of the program monitored. However, the set of states of the automaton
depends on the program monitored.
Let A? be the set of all strings over the alphabet A; additionally, L(R)
is the language defined by the regular expression R. For any program P,
whose variables belongs to V(P) and the set of secret input variables is S(P)
(S(P) ⊆ V(P)), the automaton A(P) enforcing non-interference is defined as
(Q,Φ,Ψ, δ, q0) where:
• Q is a set of states (Q = 2V(P) × {>,⊥}?),2
• Φ is a finite set of the input alphabet (specified shortly),
• Ψ is a finite set of the output alphabet (specified shortly),
• δ is a transition function (Q× Φ) −→ (Ψ×Q),
• q0, an element of Q, is the start state (q0 = (S(P), )).
A state of the automaton is a pair, (V,w), composed of a set (V ) of variables
belonging to V(P) and a word (w) belonging to a language whose alphabet is >
and ⊥. At any step of the execution, V contains all the variables whose values
may have been influenced by the initial values of the variables in S(P). w tracks
variety in the context of the execution. In our case, the context consist only
in the program counter value. If w contains > then the statement executed
belongs to a branching statement whose condition may have been influenced by
the initial values of S(P). This means that, with different values for the variables
in S(P), the current statement may not have been executed. V is obviously finite,
as the number of variables used by a given program is finite. The length of w can
be bounded. Assuming that there is no recursive function calls, the maximum
length of this word is equal to the maximum depth of branching statements. For
example, with a program having no functions and a single branching statement,
the second element of a state is a word whose maximum length is 1. Hence, for
any program P without recursive function calls, the number of states of A(P) is
finite.
The input alphabet of the automaton (Φ) corresponds to an abstraction of
the events occurring during an execution. This alphabet is composed of the
following:
branch e is generated each time a branching statement has to be evaluated.
e is the expression which (or whose value) determines the branch which
22X is the power set of X, also written P(X)
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is executed. For example, before the evaluation of the statement “if x >
10 then S1 else S2 end”, the input branch x > 10 is sent to the monitoring
automaton.
exit is generated each time a branching statement has been evaluated. For ex-
ample, after the evaluation of the statement “if x > 10 then S1 else S2 end”,
the input exit is sent to the monitoring automaton.
not S is generated each time a piece of code, S, is not evaluated. It is sent just
after the execution of the piece of code which has been executed instead of
S. For example, the statement “if x then S1 else S2 end”, with x being
true, generates the automaton input not S2 just after the execution of
S1.
A is any atomic action of the language (assignment, skip or output statement).
Any such action is sent to the automaton for validation before its execu-
tion.
The output alphabet (Ψ) is composed of the following:
ACK is used as answer for any input which is not an atomic action of the
language. The automaton acknowledges the reception of information use-
ful for tracking potential information flows but which does not require an
intervention of the automaton.
OK is used whenever the monitoring automaton authorizes the execution of an
atomic action.
NO is used whenever the monitoring automaton forbids the execution of an
atomic action.
A is any atomic action of the language. This is the answer of the monitor-
ing automaton whenever another action than the current one has to be
executed.
Fig. 3 specifies the transition function of the monitoring automaton. A
transition is written (q, φ) ψ−→ q′. It is read as follows: in the state q, on
reception of the input φ, the automaton moves to state q’ and outputs ψ. This
transition function uses two special functions. FV(e) returns the set of variables
appearing in e. For example, FV(x + y) returns the set {x, y}. modified(S) is
the set of all variables whose value may be modified by an execution of the
statement S. This function is used to take into account the implicit indirect
flows created whenever a branch is not executed. A formal definition of this
function follows:
• modified(x := e) = {x}
• modified(output e) = ∅
• modified(skip) = ∅
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• modified(if e then S1 else S2 end) = modified(S1) ∪modified(S2)
• modified(while e do S done) = modified(S)
• modified(S1 ; S2) = modified(S1) ∪modified(S2)
As can be seen in Fig. 3, the automaton forbids or edits only the executions
of output statements. For other inputs, the only thing done is to keep track in
the set V of the variables that may contain some secret information, and keep
track in w of the branching conditions encountered so far that were secret.
On the reception of an input “branch e” in the state (V,w), the automaton
checks if the value of the branching condition (e) may be influenced by the initial
values of S(P). To do so, it computes the intersection of the variables appearing
in e with the set V . If the intersection is empty, then the value of e is not
influenced by the initial values of S(P). Then the new state of the automaton is
(V,w′) where w’ is the concatenation of w and ⊥. Otherwise, if the intersection
is not empty, the transition function adds > instead of ⊥ at the end of w. In
any case, the automaton acknowledges the reception of the input by outputting
ACK.
Whenever the execution exits a branching statement, the last letter of w is
removed. This restores the information about the context to what it was before
this branching statement.
The input “not S” is used to let the automaton know that, due to the value
of a previous branching condition, the statement S has not been executed. This
is done in order to be able to detect implicit indirect flows. On the reception
of an input “not S”, the automaton verifies if the statement S may have been
executed with different values for S(P). It is the case if the context of execution
carries variety (i.e. if w does not belong to L(⊥∗)). In that case, the first
element of the new state of the automaton is the union of the first element
of the old state with the set of variables whose values may be modified by an
execution of S. Otherwise, nothing is done.
The atomic action skip is perfectly safe3. Hence, on the reception of such
an input, the automaton authorizes its execution by outputting OK and does
nothing else.
When executing an assignment (x := e), two types of flows are created.
The first one is a direct flow from the right part of the assignment (e) to the
left part (x). The execution of the assignment in “x := y” creates a flow from
y to x. The second one is an explicit indirect flow from the context of execution
(i.e. the program counter) to the left part of the assignment. The execution
of the assignment in “if b then x := y else skip end” creates a flow from b
to x. Those two flows are always created whenever an assignment is executed.
What is important is to check if secret information is carried by one of those
flows (i.e. if variety in S(P) is conveyed by one of those flows). Hence, whenever
receiving an input x := e, the automaton checks if the value of the origin
of one of those two flows is influenced by the initial values of S(P). For the
3skip is considered safe because the non-interference definition considered in this work is
not time sensitive.
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execution of the assignment of the program “if b then x := y else skip end”,
y is the origin of the direct flow to x; and b is the origin of the explicit indirect
flow to x. When receiving the input x := e in the state (V,w), the origin of
the explicit indirect flow is influenced by S(P) only if w does not belongs to the
language defined by the regular expression ⊥∗. If wcontains >, it means that
the value of the condition of a previous (but still active) branching statement
was potentially influenced by the initial values of S(P). When receiving the
input x := e in the state (V,w), the origin of the direct flow is influenced by
S(P) only if the intersection of the variables appearing in e with V is not empty.
If the value of e is influenced by the initial values of S(P) then at least one of
the variable appearing in e has its value influenced by the initial values of S(P).
Those variables are then members of V . Lets call (V ′, w′) the new automaton
state after the transition. If the origin of one of those flows is influenced by
the initial values of S(P), then the variable on the left side of the assignment is
added to V (V ′ = V ∪ {x}). If none of the origins are influenced by the initial
values of S(P), it means that the variable on the left side of the assignment
receives a new value which is not influenced by S(P). In that case, the variable
on the left side of the assignment is removed from V (V ′ = V \{x}). This makes
the mechanism flow-sensitive and enables it to deal with executions containing
the action “x := h”, followed later on by “x := l”, and finally outputting the
value of x.
The rules for the automata input “output e” prevent bad flows through two
different channels. The first one is the actual content of what is outputted. In
a public context (w belongs to L(⊥∗)), if the program tries to output a secret
(the intersection of V and the variables in e is not empty), then the value of
the output is replaced by a default value. This value can be a message to the
user letting him know that, for security reasons, the output has been denied.
To do so, the automaton outputs a new output statement to execute in place of
the current one. The second channel is the behavior of the program itself. This
channel does exist because, depending on the path followed, some outputs may
or may not be executed. In that case, any output must be forbidden; and the
automaton outputs NO.
3.2 The Semantics
The semantics merging the standard output semantics given in Fig. 2 and the
monitoring automaton is given in Fig. 4.
There are three rules for atomic actions (those actions are: skip, x := e
and output e). There is one rule for each possible answer of the automaton
to the action which will be executed. Either the automaton authorizes the
execution (EM(s)-OK), denies the execution (EM(s)-NO) or replaces the action
by another one (EM(s)-EDIT). In the case where the execution is denied, the
evaluation omits the current action (as if the action was a skip statement). In
the case where the action to be executed (A) is replaced by another one (A′),
on reception of the input A the monitoring automaton returns A′; and the
monitoring semantics execute A′ instead of A. With the transition function of
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the automaton presented in this work, A′ can only be the action outputting the
default value (output θ).
If the statement to be executed is a branching command, the evaluation be-
gins by sending to the automaton the input “branch e” where e is the condition
of the branching command. Then, the branch designated by e is executed (in
the case where the branching command is a while statement and the condition
is false, the branch executed is skip). The execution follows by sending the
automaton input “not S” where S is the branch not executed (if the branch-
ing command is a while statement and the condition is true, what happens is
equivalent to sending the automaton input not skip). Finally, the input exit
is sent to the automaton and the execution proceeds as usual. In the case of
a while statement with a condition equals to true, the execution proceeds by
executing the while statement once again.
(q, A) OK−−→ q′ σ ` A o=⇒ σ′
(q, σ)  A o=⇒ (q′, σ′) (EM(s)-OK)
(q, A) A
′
−→ q′ σ ` A′ o=⇒ σ′
(q, σ)  A o=⇒ (q′, σ′)
(EM(s)-EDIT)
(q, A) NO−−→ q
(q, σ)  A =⇒ (q, σ) (EM(s)-NO)
σ(e) = v (q, branch e) ACK−−−→ q1
(q1, σ)  Sv o=⇒ (q2, σ1)
(q2, not S¬v)
ACK−−−→ q3 (q3, exit) ACK−−−→ q4
(q, σ)  if e then Strue else Sfalse end o=⇒ (q4, σ1)
(EM(s)-IF)
σ(e) = true (q, branch e) ACK−−−→ q1
(q1, σ)  S
ol=⇒ (q2, σ1)
(q2, exit)
ACK−−−→ q3
(q3, σ1)  while e do S done ow==⇒ (q4, σ2)
(q, σ)  while e do S done ol ow====⇒ (q4, σ2)
(EM(s)-WHILEtrue)
σ(e) = false (q, branch e) ACK−−−→ q1
(q1, not S)
ACK−−−→ q2 (q2, exit) ACK−−−→ q3
(q, σ)  while e do S done =⇒ (q3, σ)
(EM(s)-WHILEfalse)
(q, σ)  S1 o1==⇒ (q1, σ1)
(q1, σ1)  S2 o2==⇒ (q2, σ2)
(q, σ)  S1 ; S2 o1 o2====⇒ (q2, σ2)
(EM(s)-SEQ)
Figure 4: Semantics of monitored executions
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3.3 Example of monitored execution
Figure 5 lays out the evolution of the monitoring mechanism during a moni-
tored execution. The program whose execution is monitored is given in column
“Program P”. This program has two inputs h and l. The execution monitored
is the one for which h equals true and l equals 22. The set of secret inputs
of P (S(P)) is {h}. The atomic actions (i.e. assignments, skip statements and
output statements) that the program will attempt to execute are given in col-
umn “Proposed action”. The actions in this column are those which would have
been executed if the execution was not monitored. The next column contains
the input which is sent to the automaton for each “proposed” action. The two
following columns contain the result of the automaton transition function on the
automaton input found on the same line (the transition function is applied on
the automaton input of the same line and the automaton state of the previous
line). “Automaton output” contains the output of the automaton sent back to
the semantics, and “Automaton state” shows the new internal state of the au-
tomaton after the transition. Finally, the last column shows the actions which
are really fulfilled by the monitored execution.
As can be seen in the column “Automaton output”, in the majority of cases
the monitoring automaton just acknowledges the reception of an input or au-
thorizes the execution of an action without altering the normal behavior of the
program. In this example, there are only two alterations of the execution (on
lines 6 and 11). The first one occurs when the program tries to output a value
which has been influenced by S(P). This output action is “output y;”. At this
point of the execution, the value contained in y as been influenced by the initial
values of the variables belonging to S(P). This is know because y belongs to
the first element of the automaton state before the execution of line 6. This
automaton state can be seen in the column “Automaton state” of the previous
line (the value in line 6 correspond to the state after the execution of line 6).
In consequence, the automaton disallows the output of this value. However, the
fact of outputting something in itself is safe because the context of execution
has not been influenced by S(P) (the second element of the automaton state
belongs to L(⊥?)). Hence, the automaton sends to the semantics an output
action to execute. The value of this output action is a default one (therefore
not influenced by S(P)). This value lets the user know that an output action
has been denied for security reasons.
On line 11, the program tries to output something while the current context
of execution (the program counter) has been influenced by S(P) (the second
element of the automaton state does not belong to L(⊥?)). Hence, if the output
occurs then an attacker could learn something about the secret values. Therefore
the automaton denies any output; it does not even give another action to execute
in place of the current one. The semantics does as if the action was “skip;”.
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4 Efficiency of the Monitoring Mechanism
The preceding section gives a formal definition of the monitoring mechanism
and an example of its behavior. This section studies the efficiency of this mon-
itoring mechanism by giving bounds on the set of executions obtained by using
this monitoring mechanism. First, it is proved that any monitored execution be-
longs to the set of non-interfering executions. This is equivalent to a soundness
proof. Then, it is proved that a non trivial set of unmonitored non-interfering
executions is included in the set of monitored executions.
4.1 Soundness
The soundness property of the monitoring mechanism is based on a notion of
non-interference between the secret inputs and the sequence outputted by an
execution. An execution is considered safe if and only if this execution does
not convey the variety in its secret inputs to the sequence outputted during
this execution; in other terms, if the secret inputs have no influence on what is
outputted during this execution.
Before stating the soundness theorem, this section gives the definition of
a notation designating the output sequence of the execution of a program P
started in the initial state σ.
Definition 4.1 (Output of a monitored execution: [[P]]σ).
For all program P whose secret inputs belong to S(P), and value store σ, “ [[P]]σ” is
the sequence outputted by the execution of P with the initial state “(S(P), ), σ”.
In other words:
[[P]]σ = o if and only if ∃ σ′ : (S(P), ), σ ` P o=⇒s σ′
The following theorem states that any monitored execution is safe; i.e. it
is non-interfering. X= is an equivalence relation between value stores. This
relation is true whenever the two stores associate the same value to any variable
belonging toX. Using this relation, the fact that σ1 and σ2 are indistinguishable
for X is written σ1
X= σ2. Xc is the complement of the set X.
Theorem 4.1 (Monitored executions are non-interfering).
For all program P which set of secret inputs is S(,) and value stores σ1 and σ2:
σ1
S(P)c
= σ2 ⇒ [[P]]σ1 = [[P]]σ2
Proof. This theorem follows directly from lemma B.6 page 35.
4.2 Monitoring Automaton versus Type System
It has been proved that any monitored execution is non-interfering. This is
a required result. However, in order to achieve this goal, in some cases the
monitoring mechanism modifies the output sequence of the execution. The
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sequence of outputs resulting from the execution of a program P with the initial
state σ may not be the same if the semantics used is the standard one (given in
Fig. 2) or the monitoring semantics (given in Fig. 4). As long as the monitoring
mechanism accomplishes its job, the lesser impact the better. The sequel gives
a lower bound on the set of non-interfering executions on which the monitoring
mechanism has no impact. It is shown that the mechanism proposed in this
report does not interfere with the output sequence of any execution of a program
which is well-typed under a security type system similar to the one of Volpano
and al. [VSI96].
Figure 6 shows the security type system. It is the same one as [VSI96]
except for a small modification of the typing environment and the addition
of a rule for the output statement (which is not in the language of [VSI96]).
The typing environment in [VSI96] is a pair (λ, γ) where λ prescribes types for
locations and γ prescribes types for identifiers. As our language does not have
locations, only γ has been kept for the type system given here. Additionally, γ
is extended to handle expressions. γ(e) is the type of the expression e in the
typing environment γ. The lattice of types used has only two elements and
is defined using the reflexive relation ≤ (L ≤ H). L is the type for public
information and H the type for secrets. A program P is well-typed if it can be
typed under a typing environment γ in which every secret input is typed secret
(i.e. ∀x ∈ S(P), γ(x) = H).
γ(e) = τ ′ τ ′ ≤ τ
γ ` e : τ (T-EXP)
γ(x) = τ ′ γ ` e : τ ′ τ ≤ τ ′
γ ` x := e : τ cmd (T-ASSIGN)
τ ≤ H
γ ` skip : τ cmd (T-SKIP)
γ ` e : L
γ ` output e : L cmd (T-PRINT)
γ ` e : τ ′ γ ` S1 : τ ′ cmd
γ ` S2 : τ ′ cmd τ ≤ τ ′
γ ` if e then S1 else S2 end : τ cmd
(T-IF)
γ ` e : τ ′ γ ` S : τ ′ cmd τ ≤ τ ′
γ ` while e do S done : τ cmd (T-WHILE)
γ ` S1 : τ cmd γ ` S2 : τ cmd
γ ` S1 ; S2 : τ cmd (T-SEQ)
Figure 6: The type system used for comparison
We can prove (Theorem 4.2) that any execution of a well-typed program
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belongs to the set of monitored executions. This means that the monitoring
mechanism does not interfere with executions of well-typed programs. To be
convinced that the inclusion in question here is strict it is sufficient to have a
look at the following program:
x := h;
x := 0;
output x
In this program, h is the only secret input. Any execution of this program is
obviously non-interfering. However, as the type system is flow insensitive this
program is ill-typed. However, the monitoring mechanism does not interfere
with the outputs of this program while still guaranteeing that any monitored
execution is non-interfering.
Theorem 4.2 (Monitoring does not interfere with type safe programs).
For all program P whose secret inputs belong to S(P), typing environment γ such
that variables belonging to S(P) are typed secret, type τ , and value stores σ and
σ′:
γ ` P : τ cmd
σ ` P o=⇒ σ′
}
⇒ [[P]]σ = o
Proof. This theorem follows directly from lemma B.11 page 46.
5 Related Work
Automaton-based monitoring and static information flow analyzes.
There has already been research on reference monitors. For example, Erlings-
son and Schneider have developed a monitoring tool called SASI [ES99]. The
properties enforced by their monitors are expressed using security automata (as
defined in [Sch00]). Their tool is then able to in-line monitors enforcing those
properties directly into object code (either x86 assembly language or Java Vir-
tual Machine Language). Following another approach, Hamlen et al. [HMS06]
develop an extension to the .NET Common Intermediate Language called Mo-
bile. This extension supports a type system enforcing the certification of in-lined
reference monitors. Mobile can check that a property expressed as an ω-regular
expression is enforced by a self-monitoring program. Therefore, it removes the
need to trust the rewriting process in-lining the monitor. A restriction of refer-
ence monitors is their limited control over the execution . They are only able
to halt an execution. Schneider [Sch00] shows that such monitors are limited
to the enforcement of safety properties. In a successful attempt to increase the
power of monitors, Ligatti et al. [LBW05a] introduce edit automata. Monitors
based on such automata are able to alter the behavior of an execution by modi-
fying the sequence of actions executed. Ligatti et al. [LBW05b] show that those
monitors are able to enforce infinite renewal properties.
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However, to the best of our knowledge, none of those monitors enforce se-
curity policies based on strong information flow properties. The vast majority
of the research on information flow concerns static analyses and involves type
systems [SM03]. In the recent years, this approach has reached a good level of
maturity. Pottier and Conchon described in [PC00] a systematic way of produc-
ing a type system usable for checking noninterference. Profiting from this ma-
turity, some “real size” languages including a security oriented type system have
been developed. Among them are JFlow [Mye99a], JIF [MNZZ01], and Flow-
Caml [Sim02, PS03]. One of the drawbacks of type systems concerns the level of
approximation involved. In order to improve the precision of those static anal-
yses, dynamic security tests have been included into some languages and taken
into account in the static analyses. The JFlow language [Mye99a, Mye99b],
which is an evolution of Java, uses the decentralized label model of Myers and
Liskov [ML98]. In this model, variables receive a label which describes allowed
information flows among the principals of the program. Some dynamic tests of
the principals hierarchy and variables labels are possible, as well as some labels
modifications [ZM01]. Zheng and Myers [ZM04] include dynamic security labels
which can be read and tested at run-time. Nevertheless, labels are not computed
at run-time. Using dynamic security tests similar to the Java stack inspection,
Banerjee and Naumann developed in [BN03] a type system guarantying non-
interference for well-typed programs and taking into account the information
about the calling context of method given by the dynamic tests.
Dynamic information flow analyzes. Even so information flow monitoring
is not as popular as information flow static analyses, there has continuously been
some research concerning it.
At the level of languages, Abadi, Lampson, and Lévy expose in [ALL96] a
dynamic analysis based on the labeled λ-calculus of Lévy. This analysis com-
putes the dependencies between the different parts of a λ-term and its final
result in order to save this result for a faster evaluation of any future equivalent
λ-term. Also based on a labeled λ-calculus, Gandhe, Venkatesh, and Sanyal
[GVS95] address the information flow related issue of need. It has to be noticed
that even some “real world” languages dispose of similar mechanisms. The lan-
guage Perl includes a special mode called “Perl Taint Mode” [WCO00]. In this
mode, the direct information flows originating with user inputs are tracked. It
is done in order to prevent the execution of “bad” commands. None of those
works take into account implicit indirect flows (created by the non-execution of
one of the branches of a branching statement).
At the level of operating systems, Weissman [Wei69] described at the end of
the 60’s a security control mechanism which dynamically computes the security
level of newly created files depending on the security level of files previously
opened by the current job. Following a similar approach, Woodward presents
its floating labels method in [Woo87]. This method deals with the problem of
over-classification of data in computer systems implementing the MAC security
model [NSA95, Bra85]. The main difference between those two works and ours
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lies in the granularity of label application. In those models [Wei69, Woo87],
at any time, there is only one label for all the data manipulated. Data’s “se-
curity levels” cannot evolve separately from each other. More recently, Suh,
Lee, Zhang, and Devadas presented in [SLZD04] an architectural mechanism,
called dynamic information flow tracking. Its aim is to prevent an attacker to
gain control of a system by giving spurious inputs to a program which may be
buggy but is not malicious. Their work looks at the problem of security under
the aspect of integrity and does not take care of information flowing indirectly
throw branching statements containing different assignments.
At the level of computers themselves, Fenton [Fen74] describes a small ma-
chine, in which storage locations have a fixed data mark. Those data marks are
used to ensure a secure execution with regard to noninterference between private
inputs and non-private outputs. However, the fixed characteristic of the data
marks forbids modularity and reuse of code by disallowing a temporary variable
to contain alternatively secrets and public information. As Fenton shows him-
self, his mechanism does not ensure confidentiality with variable data marks.
At the same level, Brown and Knight [BK01] describe a machine which dynam-
ically computes security level of data in memory words and try to ensure that
there are no undesirable flows. This work does not take care of non-executed
commands. As it has been shown in [LGJ05], this is a feature which can be
used to gain information about secrets in some cases. With a program similar
to the following one, their machine does not prevent the flow from h to x when
l is true and h is false.
x := 0;
i f l then
i f h then x := 1 e l se skip end
e l se skip end;
output x
In [MPL04], Masri, Podgurski and Leon present a dynamic information flow
analysis for structured or unstructured language. Their algorithm seems to
achieve a good level of precision for a quite complete language. However, for
the analysis of a method (which is the unit on which their algorithm applies),
their approach “requires that its control flow graph [. . . ] has been computed
beforehand”. Their approach is then not fully dynamic. Moreover, their work
seems to focus more on dynamic slicing than on non-interference monitoring.
Consequently, it does not study deeply the dynamic correction of “bad” flows.
The solution proposed is to stop the execution as soon as a potential flow from
a secret data to a public sink is detected. As explained in [LGJ05], if done
without enough care, this can create a new covert channel revealing some secret
information. To avoid this, the information flows computed must be the same
for every low-input equivalent execution. This property is not proved for the
proposed algorithm.
The case of RIFLE [VBC+04] is different from the research works presented
above. It is a complete runtime information flow security system enforcing
21
“user-centric” security policies. It includes a binary translator and a specific
architecture which, together, track the information flows. Based on this infor-
mation, a security enhanced OS enforces user policies. However, as acknowledge
by the authors, their system does not take into consideration implicit indirect
flows. It is the impossible for their mechanism to enforce non-interference like
policies. And, hence, it is impossible to enforce strict confidentiality.
6 Conclusion
This report addresses the security problem of confidentiality from the point of
view of non-interference. It is usually a property of a program. Either a program
is non-interfering or it is not. As we are interested in monitoring executions to
ensure the respect of confidentiality, the notion of non-interference is refined to a
notion of non-interfering execution. An execution ε is said to be non-interfering
if and only if any execution of the same program with the same public inputs
(as for ε) produces the same public outputs.
The monitoring mechanism proposed in the report is based on an automaton
and a special semantics. During the execution, the semantics sends to the
automaton inputs abstracting the events occurring. The automaton is in charge
of two main jobs. The first one is to track the flows of information between the
secret inputs and the current value of the variables used by the program. The
second one is to validate the execution of atomic actions (mainly outputs) in
order to ensure the respect of the confidentiality of the secret inputs. In Sect. 4.1,
it has been proved that any execution monitored by the proposed mechanism is
a non-interfering execution. This means that an attacker having access to the
low outputs of a monitored execution is never able to deduce anything about the
value of the secret inputs. An additional interesting property which has been
proved is that the monitoring mechanism does not interfere with the executions
of a program which is well-typed under a type system similar to the one of
Volpano, Smith and Irvine [VSI96].
Typicality of non-interference monitoring. In order to enforce a prop-
erty as strong as non-interference, this monitoring mechanism (as any non-
interference monitor would) has a principal particularity compared to standard
monitors. Usually, monitors are only aware of statements which are really ex-
ecuted. With the proposed mechanism, when exiting a branching statement,
the branch which has not been executed is analyzed. This is done in order to
take into account a special type of flows: implicit indirect flows. These flows
appear between the condition of a branching statement and all the variables on
the left side of an assignment in the branch which is not executed. As written
by [VBC+04], this feature is required in order to enforce non-interference.
Of course, monitoring an execution has a cost. So, what are the main inter-
ests of non-interference monitoring compared to static analyzes? The first one
lies in the granularity of the non-interference property. Static analyzes have to
take into consideration all possible executions of the program analyzed. This
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implies that if a single execution is unsafe then the program is rejected; and then
all of its executions. With a monitoring mechanism, it is possible to allow the
safe executions of a program which is known to have some unsafe executions.
Moreover, a monitoring mechanism may be more precise than static ana-
lyzes. The reason for it is that during the execution the monitoring mechanism
gets some accurate information about the “path behavior” of the program. An
example being sometimes more understandable, let us have a look at the fol-
lowing program where h is the only secret input and l the only other input (a
public one).
i f ( t e s t 1 ( l ) ) then tmp := h e l se skip end;
i f ( t e s t 2 ( l ) ) then x := tmp e l se skip end;
output x
Without information on test1 and test2 (and often, even with), a static anal-
ysis would conclude that this program is unsafe because the secret input in-
formation could be carried to x through tmp and then outputted. However, if
test1 and test2 are such that there exists no value such that both predicates
are true then any execution of the program is perfectly safe. The monitoring
mechanism would allow any execution of this program. The reason is that, l
being a public input, only executions following the same path than the current
execution is taken care by the monitoring mechanism. So, for such configura-
tions where the branching conditions are not influenced by the secret inputs, a
monitoring mechanism is at least as precise as any static analysis.
Future work. Of course, increasing the expressiveness of the language is a
first potential future work. Adding method call or even records should be quite
straightforward. Whereas, in my opinion, adding pointers to the language would
not be trivial. Another interesting feature, which is under work, is concurrency.
The language is extended with a synchronization construct and the monitor is
adapted to deal with concurrent execution of a set of sequential programs.
The analysis used on unevaluated statements is another point which would
be worth some extended work. The analysis used in this report is a really
simple one collecting the variables appearing on the left side of an assignment.
By increasing the precision of this analysis, a better precision would be achieved.
The following example emphasizes the limitation of the current analysis.
x := 0;
i f h
then skip
e l se i f false then x := 1 e l se skip end
end;
output x;
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h is the only input of the program. It is a secret input. This program outputs
0 whatever the value of h. It is then perfectly safe. However, the monitoring
mechanism detects any execution of this program as unsafe. The reason is that
the monitor does not take into consideration the values of branching conditions.
In this case, it may seem simple to improve the monitoring mechanism. However,
as explained in [LGJ05], if the goal of the mechanism is to correct bad flows
and not only detect them then the analysis must be done with great care. It is
required that, for a branching statement, whatever the branch executed and the
branch analyzed, the result of the information flow tracking must be the same.
Finally, in the work proposed in this report, there are only two categories
of data: public and secret. It would be interesting to have more. In order to
achieve this goal, we can remark that, even if there are two categories, there is
only one property on data: either data is secret or is not. Based on this idea of
“property” of data, the number of categories can be extended by increasing the
number of properties and changing the definition of automaton states. A new
state is a set of old states, one for each property. The solution is quite simple,
but its impact on the different proofs must be studied.
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A Nomenclature
2X is the power set of X, also written P(X).
A? is the set of all strings over the alphabet A.
L(E) is the language described by the regular expression E.
FV(e) is the set of free variables appearing in the expression e.
modified(S) is the analysis used for unevaluated statements. It returns the
set of variables which would be potentially be assigned to by an execution
of S.
P is a program of name P.
V(P) is the set of variables used by the program P.
Ω is a set of executions.
ω is an execution (a sequence of actions).
y
X= z is an equivalence relation which states that y and z are indistinguish-
able for X.
S(P) is the set of variables used as secret inputs by the program P.
P̂ is a predicate on executions.
P is a security policy.
A(P) is the monitoring automaton for the program P.
Q is the set of states of monitoring automata.
Φ is the input alphabet of monitoring automata.
Ψ is the output alphabet of monitoring automata.
δ is the transition function between automata states.
φ is an input to a monitoring automaton.
ψ is an output of a monitoring automaton.
q0 is the start state of a monitoring automaton.
q is a state of a monitoring automaton.
V is the first element of an automaton state. It is a set of variables.
w is the second element of an automaton state. It is a word (or string)
belonging to {>,⊥}?.
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L is the type for public information.
H is the type for secret information.
γ is a typing environment.
θ is the default output message sent whenever an action outputting a
secret is detected.
σ represents a program state during an execution.
Σ is the set of all execution states.
σ is a value store mapping variable names to their current value.
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B Proofs
The following proofs have been written before a modification of the notations
used and has not been rewritten yet. In consequence, some of the notations
found in the proofs are different from those used in the previous sections. How-
ever the modifications are straight forward.
An automaton state is now represented by a set of variables and a word
(V,w). In the proofs, it is the same set of variables with an integer (V, n). w is
a binary representation of n where > is 1 and ⊥ is 0. Therefore, w ∈ L(()⊥?)
is equivalent to n = 0.
Additionally, the function collecting the variable whose value may be mod-
ified by the execution of a statement S, called modified(S) in the previous
sections, is called LA(S) in the proofs.
Finally, the automaton output ACK is not used in the proofs. The automa-
ton output OK is used instead.
B.1 Proofs of Sect. 4.1 (Soundness)
Lemma B.1 (Same context before and after an execution). For all statement
S, automaton states q = (V, n) and qf = (Vf , nf ), and value store σ, if (q, σ) `
S
o=⇒M(s) (qf , σf ) then nf = n.
Proof. The fact that nf = n follows directly from the definition of the seman-
tics (EM(O)), and the definition of the transition function of the monitoring
automaton.
Lemma B.2 (No outputs under secret context).
For all statement S, automaton state (V, n), and value store σ, if n > 0 then
[[S]]OM(O)((V, n), σ) = .
Proof. It follows directly from the definitions of the semantics (EM(O)) and
(EO) and from the transition function of the monitoring automaton. The only
statement outputting anything is “output e”. The semantics (EM(O)) always
call the automaton to verify any action it will evaluates. Whenever the context
of execution is secret (i.e. n > 0), the monitoring automaton deny the execution
of any print statement.
Lemma B.3 (Automaton simulates execution in secret context).
For all statement S, automaton state q = (V, n), and value store σ, if (q, σ) `
S
o=⇒M(s) (qf , σf ) and n > 0 then (q, not S)→ qf .
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the derivation tree of “((V, n), σ) `
S
o=⇒M(s) (qf , σf )”. Assume the lemma holds for any sub-derivation tree, if
the last rule used is:
(EM(s)-OK) then we can conclude that :
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(1) S = “skip” or S = “y := e” or S = “output e”, and “(q, S) OK−−→ qf ”.
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(s)-OK) and
the grammar of the language. It can also be deduced from the rule
(EM(s)-OK), the transition function of the monitoring automaton,
and the semantics (EO).
Case 1: S = “skip” or S = “output e”
(a) qf = q.
It follows directly from the transition function of the monitoring
automaton.
(•) (q, not S)→ qf .
It follows directly from the transition function of the monitoring
automaton because n > 0 and LA(S) = ∅.
Case 2: S = “x := e”
(a) qf = (V ∪ {x}, n).
It follows directly from the transition function of the monitoring
automaton because n > 0.
(•) (q, not S)→ qf .
It follows directly from the transition function of the monitoring
automaton because n > 0 and LA(x := e) = {x}.
(EM(s)-EDIT) then we can conclude that :
(1) S = “output e”, and “(q, S) A
′
−→ qf ”.
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(s)-EDIT) and
the grammar of the language. It can also be deduced from the rule
(EM(s)-OK), the transition function of the monitoring automaton,
and the semantics (EO).
(2) qf = q.
It follows directly from the transition function of the monitoring au-
tomaton.
(•) (q, not S)→ qf .
It follows directly from the transition function of the monitoring au-
tomaton because n > 0 and LA(output e) = ∅.
(EM(s)-NO) then we can conclude that :
(1) S = “output e”, and “(q, S) A
′
−→ qf ”.
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(s)-NO) and
the grammar of the language. It can also be deduced from the rule
(EM(s)-OK), the transition function of the monitoring automaton,
and the semantics (EO).
(2) qf = q.
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(s)-NO).
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(•) (q, not S)→ qf .
It follows directly from the transition function of the monitoring au-
tomaton because n > 0 and LA(output e) = ∅.
(EM(s)-IF) then we can conclude that :
(1) S = “if e then S1 else S2 end”, σ(e) = v, and:
• (q, branch e) OK−−→ q1
• (q1, σ) ` Sv o=⇒M(s) (q2, σ1)
• (q2, not S¬v) OK−−→ q3
• (q3, exit) OK−−→ qf
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(s)-IF).
Lets define qi = (Vi, ni) for all integer i from 1 to 3.
(2) n1 > 0.
It follows directly from the global hypothesis n > 0 and the definition
of the transition function of the monitoring automaton.
(3) V2 = V ∪ LA(Sv).
It follows from the application of the inductive hypothesis to the
evaluation of Sv in the local conclusion (1) and the definition of the
transition (T-NOT-high).
(4) qf = (V ∪ LA(Sv) ∪ LA(S¬v), n).
From the local conclusion (2), the evaluation of Sv in the local con-
clusion (1) and lemma B.1, it is possible to show that n2 > 0. So, the
definition of the transition function of the monitoring automaton im-
ply that V3 = V2∪LA(S¬v). Finally the desired result is obtain using
the local conclusion (3), the definition of (T-EXIT) and lemma B.1.
(•) (q, not S)→ qf .
It follows directly from the transition function of the monitoring
automaton because n > 0 and LA(if e then S1 else S2 end) =
LA(S1) ∪ LA(S2).
(EM(s)-WHILEtrue) then we can conclude that :
(1) S = “while e do Sl done” and:
• (q, branch e) OK−−→ q1
• (q1, σ) ` Sl ol=⇒M(s) (q2, σ1)
• (q2, exit) OK−−→ q3
• (q3, σ1) ` while e do Sl done ow==⇒M(s) (qf , σ2)
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(s)-WHILEtrue).
Lets define qi = (Vi, ni) for all integer i from 1 to 3.
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(2) n1 > 0.
It follows directly from the global hypothesis n > 0 and the definition
of the transition function of the monitoring automaton.
(3) V3 = V ∪ LA(Sl).
It follows from the application of the inductive hypothesis to the
evaluation of Sl in the local conclusion (1) and the definition of the
transition (T-NOT-high) and (T-EXIT).
(4) Vf = V ∪ LA(Sl).
The local conclusion (2) and the definition of the transition function
imply n3 > 0. Using the inductive hypothesis on the evaluation of
while e do Sl done in the local conclusion (1), it is possible to show
that Vf = V2 ∪LA(Sl) because LA(while e do Sl done) = LA(Sl).
Then, the local conclusion (3) implies the desired result.
(•) (q, not S)→ qf .
It follows directly from the local conclusion (4) and the transi-
tion function of the monitoring automaton because n > 0 and
LA(while e do Sl done) = LA(Sl).
(EM(s)-WHILEfalse) then we can conclude that :
(1) S = “while e do Sl done” and:
• (q, branch e) OK−−→ q1
• (q1, not Sl) OK−−→ q2
• (q2, exit) OK−−→ qf
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(s)-WHILEfalse).
Lets define qi = (Vi, ni) for all integer i from 1 to 2.
(2) n1 > 0.
It follows directly from the global hypothesis n > 0 and the definition
of the transition function of the monitoring automaton.
(3) Vf = V ∪ LA(Sl).
It follows from the local conclusion (2) and the definition of the tran-
sition function of the monitoring automaton.
(•) (q, not S)→ qf .
It follows directly from the local conclusion (3) and the transi-
tion function of the monitoring automaton because n > 0 and
LA(while e do Sl done) = LA(Sl).
(EM(s)-SEQ) then we can conclude that :
(1) S = “S1 ; S2” and:
• (q, σ) ` S1 o1==⇒M(s) (q1, σ1)
• (q1, σ1) ` S2 o2==⇒M(s) (qf , σf )
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It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(s)-SEQ).
(2) (q, not S1)→ q1 and (q1, not S2)→ qf .
Those results follow from the inductive hypothesis. The second result
also makes use of lemma B.1 in order to prove that n1 > 0.
(3) qf = (V ∪ LA(S1) ∪ LA(S2), n).
It follows directly from the local conclusion (2), the global hypothesis
n > 0, lemma B.1, and the definition of the rule (T-NOT-high).
(•) (q, not S)→ qf .
It follows directly from the transition function of the monitoring au-
tomaton because n > 0 and LA(S1 ; S2) = LA(S1) ∪ LA(S2).
Lemma B.4 (LA is an over-approximation of the assigned variables). For
all statement S, automaton state q = (V, n), and value store σ, if “ (q, σ) `
S
o=⇒M(O) (qf , σf )” then:
• ∀x 6∈ LA(S) : σf (x) = σ(x)
• Let (Vf , nf ) = qf in V − LA(S) ⊆ Vf ⊆ V ∪ LA(S)
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the derivation tree of “(q, σ) ` S o=⇒M(O)
(qf , σf )”. Assume the lemma holds for any sub-derivation tree, if the last rule
used is:
(EM(O)-OK) then we can conclude that :
(1) S = “skip” or S = “y := e” or S = “output e”, “(q, S) OK−−→ qf ”,
and “σ ` S o=⇒O σf ”.
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(O)-OK) and
the grammar of the language. It can also be deduced from the rule
(EM(O)-OK), the transition function of the monitoring automaton,
and the semantics (EO).
Case 1: S = “skip” or S = “output e”
(a) qf = q and σf = σ.
It follows directly from the transition function of the monitoring
automaton and the definition of the semantics (EO).
(•) ∀x 6∈ LA(S) : σf (x) = σ(x) and V −LA(S) ⊆ Vf ⊆ V ∪ LA(S).
It follows directly from the local conclusion (a).
Case 2: S = “x := e”
(a) qf = (V ∪ {x}, n) or qf = (V − {x}, n), and σf = σ[x 7→ σ(e)].
It follows directly from the transition function of the monitoring
automaton and the definition of the semantics (EO).
(•) ∀x 6∈ LA(S) : σf (x) = σ(x) and V −LA(S) ⊆ Vf ⊆ V ∪ LA(S).
It follows directly from the local conclusion (a) because LA(S) =
{x}.
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(EM(O)-EDIT) then we can conclude that :
(1) S = “output e”, “(q, S)
output θ−−−−−→ qf ”, and “σ ` output θ o=⇒O σf ”.
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(O)-EDIT), the
grammar of the language, and the definition of the transition function
of the monitoring automaton.
(2) qf = q and σf = σ.
It follows directly from the local conclusion (1), the transition func-
tion of the monitoring automaton and the definition of the semantics
(EO).
(•) ∀x 6∈ LA(S) : σf (x) = σ(x) and V − LA(S) ⊆ Vf ⊆ V ∪ LA(S).
It follows directly from the local conclusion (2).
(EM(O)-NO) then we can conclude that :
(1) qf = q and σf = σ.
It follows directly from the definition of (EM(O)-NO), and the defini-
tion of the transition function of the monitoring automaton.
(•) ∀x 6∈ LA(S) : σf (x) = σ(x) and V − LA(S) ⊆ Vf ⊆ V ∪ LA(S).
It follows directly from the local conclusion (1).
(EM(O)-IF) then we can conclude that :
(1) S = “if e then Strue else Sfalse end”, σ(e) = v, and:
• (q, branch e) OK−−→ q1
• (q1, σ) ` Sv o=⇒M(O) (q2, σf )
• (q2, not S¬v) OK−−→ q3
• (q3, exit) OK−−→ qf
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(O)-IF).
(2) ∀x 6∈ LA(S) : σf (x) = σ(x).
It follows from the inductive hypothesis used on the deriva-
tion tree of Sv in the local conclusion (1) and the fact that
LA(if e then Strue else Sfalse end) = LA(Strue) ∪ LA(Sfalse).
Lets define qi = (Vi, ni) for all integer i from 1 to 3.
(3) V1 = V .
It follows directly from the definition of the transition function of the
monitoring automaton.
(4) V − LA(Sv) ⊆ V2 ⊆ V ∪ LA(Sv).
It follows from the inductive hypothesis applied to the derivation tree
of Sv.
(5) V 2 ⊆ Vf ⊆ V2 ∪ LA(S¬v).
It follows from the local conclusion (1) and the definition of the tran-
sition function of the monitoring automaton.
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(•) ∀x 6∈ LA(S) : σf (x) = σ(x) and V − LA(S) ⊆ Vf ⊆ V ∪ LA(S).
It follows from the fact that LA(if e then Strue else Sfalse end) =
LA(Strue) ∪ LA(Sfalse) and the local conclusions (2), (4), and (5).
(EM(O)-WHILEtrue) then we can conclude that :
(1) S = “while e do Sl done” and:
• (q, branch e) OK−−→ q1
• (q1, σ) ` Sl ol=⇒M(O) (q2, σ1)
• (q2, exit) OK−−→ q3
• (q3, σ1) ` while e do Sl done ow==⇒M(O) (qf , σf )
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(O)-WHILEtrue).
(2) V1 = V .
It follows directly from the definition of the transition function of the
monitoring automaton.
(3) ∀x 6∈ LA(Sl) : σ1(x) = σ(x) and V − LA(Sl) ⊆ V2 ⊆ V2 ∪ LA(Sl).
It follows from the inductive hypothesis applied to the derivation tree
of Sl found in the local conclusion (1).
(4) V3 = V2.
It follows directly from the definition of (T-EXIT).
(5) ∀x 6∈ LA(Sl) : σf (x) = σ1(x) and V3 − LA(Sl) ⊆ Vf ⊆ V3 ∪ LA(Sl).
It follows from the inductive hypothesis applied to the derivation
tree of while e do Sl done found in the local conclusion (1) because
LA(while e do Sl done) = LA(Sl).
(•) ∀x 6∈ LA(S) : σf (x) = σ(x) and V − LA(S) ⊆ Vf ⊆ V ∪ LA(S).
It follows from the local conclusions (3), (4), and (5) because
LA(while e do Sl done) = LA(Sl).
(EM(O)-WHILEfalse) then we can conclude that :
(1) S = “while e do Sl done” and:
• (q, branch e) OK−−→ q1
• (q1, not Sl) OK−−→ q2
• (q2, exit) OK−−→ qf
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(O)-
WHILEfalse).
(2) ∀x 6∈ LA(S) : σf (x) = σ(x).
It follows directly from the definition of (EM(O)-WHILEfalse).
(3) Vf = V or Vf = V ∪ LA(Sl).
It follows directly from the definition of the transition function of the
monitoring automaton.
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(•) ∀x 6∈ LA(S) : σf (x) = σ(x) and V − LA(S) ⊆ Vf ⊆ V ∪ LA(S).
It follows directly from the local conclusions (2) and (3) because
LA(while e do Sl done) = LA(Sl).
(EM(O)-SEQ) then we can conclude that :
(1) S = “S1 ; S2” and:
• (q, σ) ` S1 o1==⇒M(s) (q1, σ1)
• (q1, σ1) ` S2 o2==⇒M(s) (qf , σf )
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(O)-SEQ).
(2) • ∀x 6∈ LA(S1) : σ1(x) = σ(x)
• V − LA(S1) ⊆ V1 ⊆ V ∪ LA(S1)
• ∀x 6∈ LA(S2) : σf (x) = σ1(x)
• V1 − LA(S2) ⊆ Vf ⊆ V1 ∪ LA(S2)
Those results follow from the inductive hypothesis.
(•) ∀x 6∈ LA(S) : σf (x) = σ(x) and V − LA(S) ⊆ Vf ⊆ V ∪ LA(S).
It follows directly from the local conclusion (2) because
LA(S1 ; S2) = LA(S1) ∪ LA(S2).
Lemma B.5 (WDKL (while-dilemma killer lemma)). For all statement S, ex-
pression e, automaton state q = (V, n) such that n ≥ 0, and value store σ, if
“FV(e) ∩ V 6= ∅” and “ (q, σ) ` while e do S done o=⇒M(s) (qf , σf )” then:
• o = 
• Let (Vf , nf ) = qf in V ⊆ Vf
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the derivation tree of “(q, σ) `
while e do S done o=⇒M(s) (qf , σf )”. The last rule used by the derivation
tree is either (EM(O)-WHILEtrue) or (EM(O)-WHILEfalse). Assume the lemma
holds for any sub-derivation tree, if the last rule used is:
(EM(O)-WHILEtrue) then we can conclude that :
(1) S = while e do Sl done and:
• σ(e) = true
• (q, branch e) OK−−→ q1
• (q1, σ) ` Sl ol=⇒M(O) (q2, σ1)
• (q2, exit) OK−−→ q3
• (q3, σ1) ` while e do Sl done ow==⇒M(O) (qf , σf )
• o = ol ow
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(O)-WHILEtrue).
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(2) n1 > 0.
It follows directly from the definition of the transition function of
the monitoring automaton and the global hypotheses n ≥ 0 and
FV(e) ∩ V 6= ∅.
(3) ol = .
It follows from the local conclusions (1) and (2), and from lemma B.2.
(4) n3 > 0.
It follows from the local conclusions (1) and (2), lemma B.1, and the
definition of the transition function of the monitoring automaton.
(5) ow = .
It follows from the local conclusions (1) and (4), and from lemma B.2.
(6) V ⊆ V3.
From lemma B.3 and the local conclusion (1), (q1, not Sl)
OK−−→ q2.
Then, the desired result follows from the definition of the transition
function of the monitoring automaton.
(7) V3 ⊆ Vf .
It follows directly from the inductive hypothesis which can be ap-
plied because of the local conclusion (1) and the fact that the global
hypothesis FV(e) ∩ V 6= ∅ still holds.
(•) o =  and V ⊆ Vf .
It follows directly from the local conclusions (1), (3), (5), (6) and (7).
(EM(O)-WHILEfalse) then we can conclude that :
(1) S = while e do Sl done and:
• σ(e) = false
• (q, branch e) OK−−→ q1
• (q1, not Sl) OK−−→ q2
• (q2, exit) OK−−→ q3
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(O)-
WHILEfalse).
(•) o =  and V ⊆ Vf .
The fact that o =  follows directly from the definition of the rule
(EM(O)-WHILEfalse). The fact that V ⊆ Vf follows directly from
the local conclusion (1) and the definition of the transition function
of the monitoring automaton.
Lemma B.6 (Correctness). For all statement S, automaton state q = (V, n),
value stores σ and σ′ such that:
?1 (q, σ) ` S o=⇒M(s) (qf , σf ),
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?2 (q, σ′) ` S o
′
=⇒M(s) (q′f , σ′f ),
?3 ∀x 6∈ V : σ(x) = σ′(x),
?4 n ≥ 0
it is true that, there exist a variable set Vf and an integer nf such that:
• o = o′, qf = q′f = (Vf , nf ), and ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ′f (x).
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the derivation tree of “((V, n), σ) `
S
o=⇒M(s) (qf , σf )”. Assume the lemma holds for any sub-derivation tree, if
the last rule used is:
(EM(O)-OK) then we can conclude that :
(1) S = skip or S = y := e or S = output e, “(q, S) OK−−→ q′” and
“σ ` S o=⇒O σ′”.
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(O)-OK) and
the grammar of the language. It can also be deduced from the rule
(EM(O)-OK), the transition function of the monitoring automaton,
and the semantics (EO).
Case 1: S = skip
(a) o = , qf = q, and σf = σ
It follows from the case hypothesis, the facts that “(q, S) OK−−→ q′”
and “σ ` S o=⇒O σ′” (in the local conclusion (1)), the definition
of the only transition on skip for the monitoring automaton (T-
SKIP), and the definition of the only rule applying to skip in
(EO) (EO-SKIP).
(b) o′ = , q′f = q, and σ
′
f = σ
′
It follows from the global hypothesis ?2 and the reasons invoked
for the local conclusion (a).
(•) o = o′, qf = q′f = (Vf , nf ), and ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ′f (x)
It follows from the global hypothesis ?3 and the local conclusions
(a) and (b).
Case 2: S = y := e
Sub-case 2.a: n > 0 or FV(e) ∩ Vf 6= ∅
(α) o = , qf = (V ∪ {y}, n), and σf = σ[y 7→ σ(e)]
It follows from the case hypothesis, the sub-case hypothesis,
the definition (T) of the transition function of the monitoring
automaton, and the definitions of the semantics (EM(O)) and
(EO).
(β) o′ = , q′f = (V ∪ {y}, n), and σ′f = σ′[y 7→ σ′(e)]
It follows from the case hypothesis, the sub-case hypothesis,
the definition (T) of the transition function of the monitoring
automaton, and the definitions of the semantics (EM(O)) and
(EO).
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(•) o = o′, qf = q′f = (Vf , nf ), and ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ′f (x)
It follows from the global hypothesis ?3 and the local conclu-
sions (α) and (β).
Sub-case 2.b: n ≤ 0 and FV(e) ∩ Vf = ∅
(α) o = , qf = (V − {y}, n), and σf = σ[y 7→ σ(e)]
It follows from the case hypothesis, the sub-case hypothesis,
the definition (T) of the transition function of the monitoring
automaton, and the definitions of the semantics (EM(O)) and
(EO).
(β) o′ = , q′f = (V − {y}, n), and σ′f = σ′[y 7→ σ′(e)]
It follows from the case hypothesis, the sub-case hypothesis,
the definition (T) of the transition function of the monitoring
automaton, and the definitions of the semantics (EM(O)) and
(EO).
(γ) σ(e) = σ′(e)
It follows from the fact FV(e) ∩ Vf = ∅ (from the sub-case
hypothesis) and the global hypothesis ?3.
(•) o = o′, qf = q′f = (Vf , nf ), and ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ′f (x)
It follows from the global hypothesis ?3 and the local conclu-
sions (α), (β), and (γ).
Case 2: S = output e
(a) n ≤ 0 and FV(e) ∩ Vf = ∅
It follows from the definition of the rule (EM(O)-OK), the case
hypothesis, and the definition (T) of the transition function of
the monitoring automaton.
(b) o = σ(e), qf = q, and σf = σ
It follows from the case hypothesis, the facts that “(q, S) OK−−→ q′”
and the only such transition for output e (T-PRINT-ok), and the
definition of the semantics (EO).
(c) o′ = σ(e), q′f = q, and σ
′
f = σ
It follows from the case hypothesis, the local conclusion (a), the
definition (T) of the transition function of the monitoring au-
tomaton, and the definition of the semantics (EM(O)) and (EO).
(•) o = o′, qf = q′f = (Vf , nf ), and ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ′f (x)
It follows from the global hypothesis ?3 and the local conclusions
(b) and (c).
(EM(O)-EDIT) then we can conclude that :
(1) “(q, S) A
′
−→ q′” and “σ ` A′ o=⇒O σ′”.
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(O)-EDIT).
(2) S = output e, A′ = output θ, n ≤ 0, and FV(e) ∩ V 6= ∅.
It follows directly from the only transition outputting an evaluable
transition (T-PRINT-def).
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(3) o = σ(θ), qf = q, and σf = σ
It follows from the local conclusion (2), the definition of the transition
function of the monitoring automaton (T), and the definition of the
semantics (EO).
(4) o′ = σ(θ), q′f = q, and σ
′
f = σ
It follows from the fact that n ≤ 0 and FV(e)∩V 6= ∅ (from the local
conclusion (2)), the definition of the semantics (EM(O)) for actions,
the definition of the only transition of the monitoring automaton
(T) for print actions whenever n ≤ 0 and FV(e) ∩ V 6= ∅, and the
definition of the semantics (EO).
(•) o = o′, qf = q′f = (Vf , nf ), and ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ′f (x)
It follows from the global hypothesis ?3 and the local conclusions (3)
and (4).
(EM(O)-NO) then we can conclude that :
(1) “(q, S) NO−−→ q′”.
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(O)-NO).
(2) S = output e, and n > 0.
It follows directly from the only transition outputting “NO” (T-
PRINT-no).
(3) o = , qf = q, and σf = σ
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(O)-NO).
(4) o′ = , q′f = q, and σ
′
f = σ
It follows from the fact that n > 0 (from the local conclusion (2)),
the definition of the only transition of the monitoring automaton (T)
for print actions in such a case, and the definition of the semantics
(EM(O)) for actions whenever the automaton outputs “NO”.
(•) o = o′, qf = q′f = (Vf , nf ), and ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ′f (x)
It follows from the global hypothesis ?3 and the local conclusions (3)
and (4).
(EM(O)-IF) then we can conclude that :
(1) S = if e then S1 else S2 end and:
• σ(e) = v
• (q, branch e) OK−−→ q1
• (q1, σ) ` Sv o=⇒M(s) (q2, σf )
• (q2, not S¬v) OK−−→ q3
• (q3, exit) OK−−→ qf
(•) o = o′, qf = q′f = (Vf , nf ), and ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ′f (x)
Case 1: σ′(e) = v
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(a) • (q, branch e) OK−−→ q1
• (q1, σ′) ` Sv o
′
=⇒M(s) (q′2, σ′f )
• (q′2, not S¬v) OK−−→ q′3
• (q′3, exit) OK−−→ q′f
It follows from the case hypothesis, the local conclusion
(1), the definition of the only rule applying to if-statements
(EM(O)-IF), and the definition of the transition rules (T-
BRANCH-high) and (T-BRANCH-low) (Both evaluations
use the same rule as the conditions for those depend only
e and V ).
(b) o = o′, q2 = q′2 = (V2, n2), and ∀x 6∈ V2 : σf (x) = σ′f (x).
This result is obtained by applying the inductive hypothesis
to the derivations of Sv found in the local conclusions (1)
and (a).
(c) If n2 > 0 then qf = (V2 ∪ LA(S¬v), bn2/2c) = q′f else qf =
(V2, bn2/2c) = q′f .
It follows directly from the definition of transition function
of the monitoring automaton and the local conclusions (1),
(a) and (b).
(•) o = o′, qf = q′f = (Vf , nf ), and ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ′f (x)
It follows directly from the local conclusions (b) and (c) be-
cause all x, which does not belong to Vf , does not belong to
V2.
Case 2: σ′(e) = ¬v
(a) FV(e) ∩ V 6= ∅.
The negation of this property is in contradiction with the
case hypothesis, the local conclusion (1), and the global hy-
pothesis ?3.
(b) • (q, branch e) OK−−→ q1
• (q1, σ′) ` S¬v o
′
=⇒M(s) (q′2, σ′f )
• (q′2, not Sv) OK−−→ q′3
• (q′3, exit) OK−−→ q′f
It follows from the case hypothesis, the local conclusion
(1), the definition of the only rule applying to if-statements
(EM(O)-IF), and the definition of the transition rule (T-
BRANCH-high).
(c) o = o′ = .
Let q1 = (V1, n1). The local conclusion (1), the global hy-
pothesis ?4, and the definition of (T-BRANCH-high) imply
that n1 is greater than 0. This and lemma B.2 imply the
above result.
39
Let qa and qb = (Vb, nb) be monitoring automaton states such
that “(q1, notSv)
OK−−→ qa” and “(qa, notS¬v) OK−−→ qb”.
(d) There exists qc such that “(q1, notS¬v)
OK−−→ qc” and
“(qc, notSv)
OK−−→ qb”.
It is obvious from the definition of (T-NOT-high) and (T-
NOT-low).
(e) q3 = qb = q′3.
It follows from lemma B.3 and the local conclusions (1), (b),
and (d).
(f) qf = q′f .
It follows directly from the definition of (T-EXIT) and the
local conclusions (e), (1), and (b).
(g) Vb = V ∪ LA(Sv) ∪ LA(S¬v).
In the proof of local conclusion (c), we proved that n1 is
greater than 0. Then the above result follows directly from
the definition of (T-NOT-high).
(h) ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ′f (x)
From the definition of (T-EXIT) and the local conclusions
(1), (e), and (g), Vf = V ∪LA(Sv)∪LA(S¬v). From the eval-
uation of Sv (in the local conclusion (1)) and lemma B.4, if x
does not belongs to Vf , and so does not belongs to LA(Sv),
σf (x) = σ(x). From the evaluation of S¬v (in the local con-
clusion (b)) and lemma B.4, if x does not belongs to Vf , and
so does not belongs to LA(S¬v), σ′f (x) = σ′(x). Addition-
ally, if x does not belongs to Vf then it does not belongs to
V ; which implies that σ(x) = σ′(x) because of the global
hypothesis ?3. Finally, those three equalities imply that if x
does not belongs to Vf then σf (x) = σ′f (x).
(•) o = o′, qf = q′f = (Vf , nf ), and ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ′f (x)
It follows directly from the local conclusions (c), (f) and (h).
(EM(O)-WHILEtrue) then we can conclude that :
(1) S = while e do Sl done and:
• σ(e) = true
• (q, branch e) OK−−→ q1
• (q1, σ) ` Sl ol=⇒M(O) (q2, σ1)
• (q2, exit) OK−−→ q3
• (q3, σ1) ` while e do Sl done ow==⇒M(O) (qf , σf )
• o = ol ow
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(O)-WHILEtrue).
(•) o = o′, qf = q′f = (Vf , nf ), and ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ′f (x)
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Case 1: σ′(e) = true
(a) • (q, branch e) OK−−→ q1
• (q1, σ′) ` Sl o
′
l=⇒M(O) (q′2, σ′1)
• (q′2, exit) OK−−→ q′3
• (q′3, σ′1) ` while e do Sl done
o′w==⇒M(O) (q′f , σ′f )
• o′ = o′l o′w
It follows directly from the local conclusion (1), the global
hypothesis ?2, the case hypothesis, the definition of the only
rule applying to this evaluation (EM(O)-WHILEtrue), and
the definition of the transition function of the monitoring
automaton.
(b) ol = o′l, q2 = q
′
2 = (V2, n2), ∀x 6∈ V2 : σ1(x) = σ′1(x), and
n2 = n.
This result is obtained by applying the inductive hypothesis
to the derivations of Sl found in the local conclusions (1) and
(a).
(c) q3 = (V2, bn2/2c) = q′3.
It follows directly from the definition of transition function
of the monitoring automaton and the local conclusions (1),
(a) and (b).
(d) ow = o′w, qf = q′f , and ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ′f (x).
This result is obtained by applying the inductive hypothesis
to the derivations of while e do Sl done found in the local
conclusions (1) and (a). It is possible to apply the inductive
hypothesis because of the local conclusions (c) and (b).
(•) o = o′, qf = q′f = (Vf , nf ), and ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ′f (x)
It follows directly from the local conclusions (1), (a), (b),
and (d).
Case 2: σ′(e) = false
(a) FV(e) ∩ V 6= ∅.
The negation of this property is in contradiction with the
case hypothesis, the local conclusion (1), and the global hy-
pothesis ?3.
(b) n1 ≥ 0.
The local conclusions (a) and (1), the global hypothesis ?4,
and the definition of (T-BRANCH-high) imply that n1 is
greater than 0.
(c) ol = .
It follows from the local conclusions (1) and (b), and from
lemma B.2.
(d) • (q, branch e) OK−−→ q1
• (q1, not Sl) OK−−→ q′2
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• (q′2, exit) OK−−→ q′f
It follows directly from the local conclusion (1), the global
hypothesis ?2, the case hypothesis, the definition of the only
rule applying to this evaluation (EM(O)-WHILEfalse), and
the definition of the transition function of the monitoring
automaton.
(e) o′ =  and σ′f = σ
′.
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(O)-
WHILEfalse).
(f) q3 = (V3, n3) = q′f .
It follows from the local conclusions (1) and (d), lemma B.3,
and the definition of the transition function of the monitoring
automaton for the input exit..
(g) V3 = V ∪ LA(Sl).
It follows from the local conclusions (f), (d), and (b), and
the definition of the transition function of the monitoring
automaton.
(h) ow =  and V3 ⊆ Vf .
It follows from the local conclusions (1), (a) and (g), and
from lemma B.5.
(i) ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ1(x) and Vf = V3.
Both results follow from lemma B.4, the fact that
“LA(while e do S done) = LA(S)”. For the first re-
sult, from the local conclusion (g) and (h), any variable x,
which does not belong to Vf , does not belong to LA(Sl).
For the second result, the local conclusions (g) imply that
V3 = V3 ∪ LA(Sl). This result combine with the local con-
clusion (h) and the conclusions of lemma B.4 imply that
Vf = V3.
(j) ∀x 6∈ Vf : σ1(x) = σ′f (x).
For all variable x, if x does not belong to Vf then the local
conclusions (i) and (g) imply that x does not belong to V .
And so, the global hypothesis ?3 implies that σ(x) = σ′(x).
For all variable x, if x does not belong to Vf then the lo-
cal conclusions (i) and (g) imply that x does not belong to
LA(Sl). Which, in turn, combined with the local conclusion
(1) and lemma B.4, implies that σ1(x) = σ(x). Those two
equalities combined with the local conclusion (e) imply the
desired result.
(•) o = o′, qf = q′f = (Vf , nf ), and ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ′f (x).
From the local conclusion (1), o = ol ow. So, it follows from
the local conclusions (c), (h), and (e) that o′ = o. From the
local conclusion (f), q3 = q′f . As done at the beginning of the
proof of this lemma, it can be easily proved that nf = n3.
This result combined with the local conclusions (i) and (f)
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imply that qf = q3 = q′f . Finally, from the local conclusions
(i) and (j) ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ′f (x).
(EM(O)-WHILEfalse) then we can conclude that :
(1) S = while e do Sl done and:
• σ(e) = false
• (q, branch e) OK−−→ q1
• (q1, not Sl) OK−−→ q2
• (q2, exit) OK−−→ q3
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(O)-
WHILEfalse).
(2) o = , qf = q3, σf = σ, and V ⊆ Vf .
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(O)-WHILEfalse)
and the definition of the transition function of the monitoring au-
tomaton.
(•) o = o′, qf = q′f = (Vf , nf ), and ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ′f (x)
Case 1: σ′(e) = false
(a) o′ = , q′f = q3, σ
′
f = σ
′.
It follows from the global hypothesis ?2, the case hypoth-
esis, the definition of the only rule applying to this evalu-
ation (EM(O)-WHILEfalse), and the definition of the tran-
sition function of the monitoring automaton. In this case,
the transitions depend only on the initial state q and the
expression e.
(•) o = o′, qf = q′f = (Vf , nf ), and ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ′f (x)
The first two equalities follow from the local conclusions (2)
and (a). From the local conclusion (2), all variable x, which
does not belong to Vf , does not belong to V . And so, the
global hypothesis ?3 implies that σ(x) = σ′(x). Then, from
the local conclusions (2) and (a), ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ′f (x).
Case 2: σ′(e) = true
(a) FV(e) ∩ V 6= ∅.
The negation of this property is in contradiction with the
case hypothesis, the local conclusion (1), and the global hy-
pothesis ?3.
(b) • σ(e) = true
• (q, branch e) OK−−→ q1
• (q1, σ′) ` Sl o
′
l=⇒M(O) (q′2, σ′1)
• (q′2, exit) OK−−→ q′3
• (q′3, σ′1) ` while e do Sl done
o′w==⇒M(O) (q′4, σ′f )
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• o′ = o′l o′w
It follows from the global hypothesis ?2, the case hypothe-
sis, the definition of the only rule applying to this evaluation
(EM(O)-WHILEtrue), the local conclusion (a), and the defini-
tion of the transition function of the monitoring automaton.
Let q1 = (V1, n1), q′3 = (V ′3 , n′3), and q′f = (V
′
f , n
′
f ).
(c) n1 ≥ 0.
The local conclusions (a) and (b), the global hypothesis ?4,
and the definition of (T-BRANCH-high) imply that n1 is
greater than 0.
(d) o′l = .
It follows from the local conclusions (b) and (c), and from
lemma B.2.
(e) q′3 = q3 = (Vf , nf ).
It follows from the local conclusions (1) and (b), lemma B.3,
and the definition of the rule (EM(O)-WHILEtrue).
(f) Vf = V ∪ LA(Sl).
It follows from the local conclusions (c), (1), and (2), and
the definition of the transition function of the monitoring
automaton.
(g) ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ′1(x).
For all variable x, if x does not belong to Vf then the local
conclusion (f) implies that x does not belong to V . And so,
the global hypothesis ?3 implies that σ(x) = σ′(x). For all
variable x, if x does not belong to Vf then the local conclusion
(f) implies that x does not belong to LA(Sl). Which, in
turn, combined with the local conclusion (b) and lemma B.4,
implies that σ′f (x) = σ
′(x). Those two equalities combined
with the local conclusion (2) imply the desired result.
(h) o′w =  and V ′3 ⊆ V ′f .
It follows from the local conclusions (b) and (a), and from
lemma B.5.
(i) ∀x 6∈ Vf : σ′f (x) = σ′1(x) and V ′f = V ′3 .
Both results follow from lemma B.4, the fact that
“LA(while e do S done) = LA(S)”. For the first re-
sult, from the local conclusion (f), any variable x, which
does not belong to Vf , does not belong to LA(Sl). For
the second result, the local conclusions (e) and (f) imply
that V ′3 = V ′3 ∪ LA(Sl). This result combine with the local
conclusion (h) and the conclusions of lemma B.4 imply that
V ′f = V
′
3 .
(•) o = o′, qf = q′f = (Vf , nf ), and ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ′f (x).
From the local conclusion (b), o′ = o′l o
′
w. So, it follows from
the local conclusions (2), (d), and (h) that o′ = o. From the
local conclusion (e), qf = q′3. As done at the beginning of the
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proof of this lemma, it can be easily proved that n′f = n
′
3.
This result combined with the local conclusion (i) implies
that q′f = q
′
3 = qf . Finally, from the local conclusions (i)
and (g) ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ′f (x).
(EM(O)-SEQ) then we can conclude that :
(1) S = S1 ; S2, (q, σ) ` S1 o1==⇒M(O) (q1, σ1), (q1, σ1) ` S2 o2==⇒M(O)
(qf , σf ), and o = o1 o2.
It follows directly from the definition of the rule (EM(O)-SEQ).
(2) (q, σ′) ` S1 o
′
1==⇒M(O) (q′1, σ′1), (q′1, σ′1) ` S2
o′2==⇒M(O) (q′f , σ′f ), and
o′ = o′1 o
′
2.
It follows from the global hypothesis ?2, the local conclusion (2), and
the definition of the rule (EM(O)-SEQ).
(3) o1 = o′1, q1 = q′1 = (V1, n1), and ∀x 6∈ V1 : σ1(x) = σ′1(x)
This result can be obtained from the inductive hypothesis using the
evaluations of S1 in the local conclusions (1) and (2).
(4) o2 = o′2, qf = q′f = (Vf , nf ), and ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ′f (x)
This result can be obtained from the inductive hypothesis using the
evaluations of S2 in the local conclusions (1) and (2), and the fact
that ∀x 6∈ V1 : σ1(x) = σ′1(x) (from the local conclusion (3)).
(•) o = o′, qf = q′f = (Vf , nf ), and ∀x 6∈ Vf : σf (x) = σ′f (x)
It follows from the global hypothesis the local conclusions (1), (2),
(3), and (4).
B.2 Proofs of Sect. 4.2
Lemma B.7 (Simple Security). For all typing environment γ, expression e,
and command type τ cmd, if γ ` e : τ then, for all variable x belonging to
FV(e), γ(x) ≤ τ .
Proof. This lemma is just a reformulation of the (Simple Security) lemma ap-
pearing in [VSI96].
Lemma B.8 (Confinement). For all typing environment γ, command C, and
command type τ cmd, if γ ` C : τ cmd then, for all variable x belonging to
LA(C), τ ≤ γ(x).
Proof. This lemma is just a reformulation of the (Confinement) lemma appear-
ing in [VSI96].
Lemma B.9 (Confined Outputs). For all command C, typing environment γ,
and value stores σ and σ′ if:
?1 γ ` C : H cmd,
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?2 σ ` C o=⇒O σ′,
then o = .
Proof. The proof goes by contradiction. If o 6=  then C contains a command
output e. If it does, because of the typing rules, C must be typed L cmd. This
is in contradiction with the hypothesis ?1.
Lemma B.10 (Helper 1). For all command C, automaton states (V, n) and
(V ′, n), and value stores σ and σ′, if ((V, n), σ) ` C =⇒M(O) ((V ′, n), σ′) then,
for all n′ greater or equal to n, ((V, n′), σ) ` C =⇒M(O) ((V ′, n′), σ′).
Proof. The monitoring mechanism does not influence the final value store ob-
tained after the execution. So, changing the automaton state does not change
the final value store. If the command C does not contain print statements,
then any execution of C (whatever the automaton state) outputs nothing. If
the command C contains a print statement executed, then it implies that n is
greater than 0 (otherwise something would be printed). The behavior of the
automaton with regard to print statements is the same for any n above 0. So
having n′ greater than n (itself greater than 0) does not change the behavior of
the automaton. So the output is identical.
Theorem B.11 (Monitoring Automaton is more precise). For all command4
C, typing environment γ, command type τ cmd, value stores σ and σ′, and
automaton state (V, n), if:
?1 ∀x ∈ V, γ(x) = H,
?2 n > 0⇒ τ = H,
?3 γ ` C : τ cmd,
?4 σ ` C o=⇒O σ′,
then there exists an automaton state (V ′, n) such that:
• ((V, n), σ) ` C o=⇒M(O) ((V ′, n), σ′),
• ∀x ∈ V ′, γ(x) = H.
Proof. The proof is done by induction on the size of the derivation tree of
“σ ` C o=⇒O σ′”. Assume the theorem holds for any sub-derivation tree. If the
last semantics rule used is:
(EO-ASSIGN) then we can conclude that :
(1) • C is “x := e”,
• σ ` C =⇒O σ[x 7→ σ(e)].
It follows directly from the rule (EO-ASSIGN).
4We use “command” and “statements” as synonyms
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(2) ((V, n), σ) ` C =⇒M(O) ((V ′, n), σ[x 7→ σ(e)]).
It follows directly from the local conclusion (1) and the rules (T-
ASSIGN-sec), (T-ASSIGN-pub), (EM(O)-OK), and (EO-ASSIGN).
(3) ∀y ∈ V ′, γ(y) = H.
Case 1: n = 0 and FV(e) ∩ V = ∅.
(a) V ′ ⊆ V .
It follows directly from the rule (T-ASSIGN-pub).
(◦) ∀y ∈ V ′, γ(y) = H.
It follows from the local conclusion (a) and the global hy-
pothesis ?1.
Case 2: n > 0 or FV(e) ∩ V 6= ∅.
(a) V ′ = V ∪ {x}.
It follows directly from the rule (T-ASSIGN-sec).
(b) γ(x) = H.
If n > 0 then, because of the global hypothesis ?2, τ = H;
and so, because of the global hypotheses ?3 and the typ-
ing rule (T-ASSIGN) (which is the only one applying to
“x := e”), γ(x) = H. If FV(e) ∩ V 6= ∅ then there exists
a variable y in FV(e) such that y ∈ V . The global hypothe-
sis ?1 implies that γ(y) = H. Then, the global hypothesis ?3
and lemma B.7 imply that τ = H; and so, because of the
typing rule (T-ASSIGN) (which is the only one applying to
“x := e”), γ(x) = H.
(◦) ∀y ∈ V ′, γ(y) = H.
It follows from the global hypothesis ?1 and the local conclu-
sions (a) and (b).
(•) there exists an automaton state (V ′, n) such that “((V, n), σ) `
C
o=⇒M(O) ((V ′, n), σ′)” and “∀x ∈ V ′, γ(x) = H”.
If follows directly from the local conclusions (2) and (3).
(EO-SKIP) then we can conclude that :
(1) • C is “skip”,
• σ ` C =⇒O σ.
It follows directly from the rule (EO-SKIP).
(2) ((V, n), σ) ` C =⇒M(O) ((V, n), σ).
It follows directly from the local conclusion (1) and the rules (T-
SKIP), (EM(O)-OK), and (EO-SKIP).
(•) there exists an automaton state (V ′, n) such that “((V, n), σ) `
C
o=⇒M(O) ((V ′, n), σ′)” and “∀x ∈ V ′, γ(x) = H”.
If follows directly from the local conclusion (2) and from the global
hypothesis ?1.
(EO-PRINT) then we can conclude that :
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(1) • C is “output e”,
• σ ` C σ(e)===⇒O σ.
It follows directly from the rule (EO-PRINT).
(2) n = 0 and FV(e) ∩ V = ∅.
The global hypothesis ?3, the local conclusion (1) and the typing
rule (T-PRINT) (the only one applying to “output e”) imply that
τ = L. Hence, the global hypothesis ?2 implies n = 0. The typing
rule (T-PRINT) also implies that “γ ` e : τ ”. Then lemma B.7
implies that, for all y in FV(e), γ(y) = L. Hence, because of the
global hypothesis ?1, FV(e) ∩ V = ∅.
(3) ((V, n), σ) ` C σ(e)===⇒M(O) ((V, n), σ).
It follows from the transition (T-PRINT-ok) (which is the only one
applying because of the local conclusions (1) and (2)) and the rules
(EM(O)-OK) and (EO-PRINT).
(•) there exists an automaton state (V ′, n) such that “((V, n), σ) `
C
o=⇒M(O) ((V ′, n), σ′)” and “∀x ∈ V ′, γ(x) = H”.
If follows directly from the local conclusion (3) and from the global
hypothesis ?1.
(EO-IF) then we can conclude that :
(1) • C is “if e then Ctrue else Cfalse end”,
• σ(e) = v
• σ ` Cv o=⇒O σ′.
It follows directly from the rule (EO-IF).
(2) There exists a type τ ′ such that:
• τ ≤ τ ′,
• γ ` e : τ ′,
• γ ` Ctrue : τ ′ cmd,
• γ ` Cfalse : τ ′ cmd.
It follows directly from the local conclusion (1), the
global hypothesis ?3 and the only typing rule applying to
“if e then Ctrue else Cfalse end” (T-IF).
(•) There exists an automaton state (V ′, n) such that “((V, n), σ) `
C
o=⇒M(O) ((V ′, n), σ′)” and “∀x ∈ V ′, γ(x) = H”.
Case 1: FV(e) ∩ V 6= ∅.
(a) τ ′ = H.
From the local conclusion (2), γ ` e : τ ′. From the case hy-
pothesis and the global hypothesis ?1, there exists a variable
y in FV(e) such that γ(y) = H. Using lemma B.7, those two
properties imply that τ ′ = H.
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(b) There exists an automaton state (V ′, 2n + 1) such that
“((V, 2n + 1), σ) ` Cv o=⇒M(O) ((V ′, 2n + 1), σ′)”, and “∀x ∈
V ′, γ(x) = H”.
It follows directly from the inductive hypothesis, the global
hypotheses ?1 and the local conclusions (a), (2) and (1).
(c) ((V, n), σ) ` C o=⇒M(O) ((V ′ ∪ LA(C¬v), n), σ′).
It follows from the only rule applying to
“if e then Ctrue else Cfalse end” (EM(O)-IF), the local
conclusion (b), and the transition rules (T-BRANCH-high)
(which is the only one applying to branche because of the
case hypothesis), (T-NOT-high), and (T-EXIT).
(d) ∀x ∈ V ′ ∪ LA(C¬v), γ(x) = H.
As, from the local conclusion (a) τ ′ = H and from the local
conclusion (2) γ ` C¬v : τ ′ cmd, lemma B.8 implies that,
for all x belonging to LA(C¬v), γ(x) = H. This result,
combined with the local conclusion (b), implies the desired
result.
(◦) There exists an automaton state (V ′, n) such that
“((V, n), σ) ` C o=⇒M(O) ((V ′, n), σ′)” and “∀x ∈ V ′, γ(x) =
H”.
It follows directly from the local conclusions (c) and (d).
Case 2: FV(e) ∩ V = ∅.
(a) There exists an automaton state (V ′, 2n) such that
“((V, 2n), σ) ` Cv o=⇒M(O) ((V ′, 2n), σ′)” and “∀x ∈
V ′, γ(x) = H”.
It follows directly from the inductive hypothesis, the global
hypotheses ?1 and ?2, and the local conclusions (2) and (1).
(b) ((V, n), σ) ` C o=⇒M(O) ((V ′′, n), σ′) with n > 0 ⇒ (V ′′ =
V ′ ∪ LA(C¬v)) and n = 0⇒ V ′′ = V ′.
It follows from the only rule applying to
“if e then Ctrue else Cfalse end” (EM(O)-IF), the local
conclusion (a), and the transition rules (T-BRANCH-low)
(which is the only one applying to branche because of
the case hypothesis), (T-NOT-high), (T-NOT-low), and
(T-EXIT).
(c) ∀x ∈ V ′′, γ(x) = H.
If n = 0 then V ′′ = V ′ and the desired property follows di-
rectly from the global hypothesis ?1. If n > 0 then the global
hypothesis ?2 implies τ = H. As, from the local conclusion
(2) τ ≤ τ ′ and γ ` C¬v : τ ′ cmd, lemma B.8 implies that,
for all x belonging to LA(C¬v), γ(x) = H. This result, com-
bined with the local conclusions (b) and (a), implies that if
n > 0 then ∀x ∈ V ′′, γ(x) = H.
(◦) There exists an automaton state (V ′, n) such that
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“((V, n), σ) ` C o=⇒M(O) ((V ′, n), σ′)”, and “∀x ∈ V ′, γ(x) =
H”.
It follows directly from the local conclusions (b) and (c).
(EO-WHILEtrue) then we can conclude that :
(1) • C is “while e do Cl done”,
• σ(e) = true
• σ ` Cl ; while e do Cl done o=⇒O σ′.
It follows directly from the rule (EO-WHILEtrue).
(2) There exists a type τ ′ such that:
• τ ≤ τ ′,
• γ ` e : τ ′,
• γ ` Cl : τ ′ cmd.
It follows directly from the local conclusion (1), the global hypoth-
esis ?3 and the only typing rule applying to “while e do Cl done”
(T-WHILE).
(3) γ ` Cl ; while e do Cl done : τ ′ cmd.
From the local conclusion (2) and the typing rule (T-WHILE), γ `
while e do Cl done : τ ′ cmd. Hence, as from the local conclusion
(2) γ ` Cl : τ ′ cmd, the typing rule (T-SEQ) implies the desired
result.
(4) There exists an automaton state (V ′, n) such that “((V, n), σ) `
Cl ; while e do Cl done
o=⇒M(O) ((V ′, n), σ′)”, and “∀x ∈ V ′, γ(x) =
H”.
It follows directly from the inductive hypothesis, the global hypothe-
ses ?1 and ?2, and the local conclusions (2), (3) and (1).
(5) There exist an automaton state (Vl, n) and a value store σl such that:
• ((V, n), σ) ` Cl ol=⇒M(O) ((Vl, n), σl),
• ((Vl, n), σl) ` while e do Cl done ow==⇒M(O) ((V ′, n), σ′),
• o = ol ow.
It follows from the local conclusion (4), the only semantics rule ap-
plying to Cl ; while e do Cl done (EM(O)-SEQ), and lemma B.1.
(6) “((V, n), σ) ` C o=⇒M(O) ((V ′, n), σ′)”.
Case 1: τ ′ = H.
(a) ol = .
It follows from the case hypothesis and lemma B.9 applied
to the local conclusions (2) and (5).
(b) For all n′ greater than n, ((V, n′), σ) ` Cl ol=⇒M(O)
((Vl, n′), σl).
It follows from lemma B.10 and the local conclusions (a) and
(5).
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(◦) “((V, n), σ) ` C o=⇒M(O) ((V ′, n), σ′)”.
It follows from the semantics rule (EM(O)-WHILEtrue), the
transition (T-BRANCH-low) and (T-BRANCH-high), the
local conclusion (b), the transition (T-EXIT), the local con-
clusion (5).
Case 2: τ ′ 6= H.
(a) n = 0 and FV(e) ∩ V = ∅.
As τ ≤ τ ′ (from the local conclusion (2)), the case hypothesis
and the global hypothesis ?2 imply n = 0. As γ ` e : τ ′ (from
the local conclusion (2)), the case hypothesis, lemma B.7,
and the global hypothesis ?1 imply FV(e) ∩ V = ∅.
(b) ((V, 2n), σ) ` Cl ol=⇒M(O) ((Vl, 2n), σl).
It follows from the local conclusion (5) and the fact that
2n = n (because of the local conclusion (a)).
(◦) “((V, n), σ) ` C o=⇒M(O) ((V ′, n), σ′)”.
It follows from the semantics rule (EM(O)-WHILEtrue), the
transition (T-BRANCH-low) (which is the only one applying
because of the local conclusion (a)), the local conclusion (b),
the transition (T-EXIT), the local conclusion (5).
(•) There exists an automaton state (V ′, n) such that “((V, n), σ) `
C
o=⇒M(O) ((V ′, n), σ′)”, and “∀x ∈ V ′, γ(x) = H”.
It follows directly from the local conclusions (6) and (4).
(EO-WHILEfalse) then we can conclude that :
(1) • C is “while e do Cl done”,
• σ(e) = false
• o = 
• σ′ = σ.
It follows directly from the rule (EO-WHILEfalse).
(2) There exists a type τ ′ such that:
• τ ≤ τ ′,
• γ ` e : τ ′,
• γ ` Cl : τ ′ cmd.
It follows directly from the local conclusion (1), the global hypoth-
esis ?3 and the only typing rule applying to “while e do Cl done”
(T-WHILE).
(3) ((V, n), σ) ` C =⇒M(O) ((V ′, n), σ) with (n > 0 ∨ FV(e) ∩ V 6= ∅) ⇒
(V ′ = V ∪ LA(Cl)) and (n = 0 ∧ FV(e) ∩ V = ∅)⇒ V ′ = V .
It follows from the only rule applying to “while e do Cl done” when-
ever σ(e) = false (EM(O)-WHILEfalse) and the transition rules (T-
BRANCH-low), (T-BRANCH-high), (T-NOT-high), (T-NOT-low),
and (T-EXIT).
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(4) (n > 0 ∨ FV(e) ∩ V 6= ∅)⇒ (∀x ∈ LA(Cl), γ(x) = H).
If n > 0 then the global hypothesis ?2 imply that τ = H. Hence,
because of the local conclusion (2), τ ′ = H. If FV(e) ∩ V 6= ∅ then,
from the global hypothesis ?1, there exists a variable y in FV(e) such
that γ(y) = H. Using lemma B.7, as γ ` e : τ ′ (from the local
conclusion (1)), this implies that τ ′ = H. As τ ′ = H in both cases
(n > 0 and FV(e) ∩ V 6= ∅), the local conclusion (2) (γ ` Cl :
τ ′ cmd) and lemma B.8 imply the desired result.
(•) There exists an automaton state (V ′, n) such that “((V, n), σ) `
C
o=⇒M(O) ((V ′, n), σ′)”, and “∀x ∈ V ′, γ(x) = H”.
It follows directly from the local conclusions (3) and (4) and from
the global hypothesis ?1.
(EO-SEQ) then we can conclude that :
(1) There exists a value store σ′1 such that:
• C is “C1 ; C2”,
• σ ` C1 o1==⇒O σ′1,
• σ′1 ` C2 o2==⇒O σ′,
• o = o1 o2.
It follows directly from the rule (EO-SEQ).
(2) • γ ` C1 : τ cmd,
• γ ` C2 : τ cmd.
It follows directly from the global hypothesis ?3, the local conclusion
(1), and the only typing rule applying to “C1 ; C2” (T-SEQ).
(3) there exists an automaton state (V ′1 , n) such that “((V, n), σ) `
C1
o1==⇒M(O) ((V ′1 , n), σ′1)” and “∀x ∈ V ′1 , γ(x) = H”.
It follows directly from the inductive hypothesis, the global hypothe-
ses ?1 and ?2, and the local conclusions (2) and (1).
(4) there exists an automaton state (V ′2 , n) such that “((V ′1 , n), σ′1) `
C2
o2==⇒M(O) ((V ′2 , n), σ′2)”, and “∀x ∈ V ′2 , γ(x) = H”.
It follows directly from the inductive hypothesis, the local conclusion
(3), the global hypothesis ?2, and the local conclusions (2) and (1).
(5) ((V, n), σ) ` C o1o2===⇒M(O) ((V ′2 , n), σ′2).
It follows from the rule (EM(O)-SEQ) and the local conclusions (3)
and (4).
(•) There exists an automaton state (V ′, n) such that “((V, n), σ) `
C
o=⇒M(O) ((V ′, n), σ′)” and “∀x ∈ V ′, γ(x) = H”.
It follows directly from the local conclusions (5) and (4).
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